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Registration is Fundamental 
 




Under the Copyright Act, copyright owners can file infringement actions 
only if registration of their copyright claim with the Copyright Office “has been 
made” or “has been refused.” The United States Supreme Court recently granted 
certiorari in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com, in order to decide whether 
registration is “made” when a claimant files a registration application or when 
the Copyright Office registers the claim. 
This article argues that the Court should hold that registration occurs 
when the Copyright Office registers the claim, in order to ensure that federal 
courts can benefit from the expertise of the Copyright Office. The Copyright 
Office recently began publishing the opinions of Copyright Office Review Board. 
This article uses those administrative opinions to show how the Copyright Office 
has developed the concepts of "originality" and "creativity" in ways that are 
helpful to the federal courts. It concludes with an Appendix listing the Copyright 






In the United States, copyright ownership has always involved registration. Initially, it 
required registration with a district court. Later, it required registration with the Copyright 
Office. Eventually, registration became largely optional. Today, copyright ownership does not 
require registration at all. But registration is still important, at least in part because it is a 
prerequisite for filing a copyright infringement action. 
And yet, it is surprisingly unclear when registration actually occurs. Some circuits have 
held that registration occurs when the Copyright Office decides whether to register a work or 
reject the registration application. But others have held that a work is registered as soon as the 
copyright owner files a registration application. The former rely primarily on the text of the 
Copyright Act, and the latter rely primarily on the unfairness of making the copyright owner wait 
for the Copyright Office to act. On June 28, 2018, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com, in order to resolve the disagreement.1 
The Court will probably conclude that registration occurs when the Copyright Office 
either registers or refuses to register a copyright claim. After all, the Copyright Act provides that 
                                                 
 Candidate for J.D. 2019, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A. Centre College, 2016. 
† Spears-Gilbert Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. J.D., New York University 
School of Law, 2005; M.F.A., San Francisco Art Institute, 1997; B.A, University of California, Berkeley, 1995. 
1 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, No. 17-571, 2018 WL 3148286, at *1 (U.S. June 28, 
2018). 
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a copyright owner cannot file a copyright infringement action until registration “has been made” 
or “has been refused” by the Copyright Office. 2  The Court tends to rely on statutory text 
whenever possible, and the most natural reading of the Copyright Act requires Copyright Office 
action before a copyright owner can file an infringement action. While it is inconvenient for 
copyright owners to wait for the Copyright Office to decide their registration applications, it also 
provides an incentive for them to register early and often. 
But waiting for the Copyright Office is also good policy. While eligibility for registration 
is an issue for only a tiny minority of works, the Copyright Office has extensive experience in 
determining whether works qualify for registration. Courts do not. Of course, courts need not 
defer to the Copyright Office’s registration decisions. But they can benefit from its 148 years of 
expertise in evaluating copyrightable subject matter. 3  In particular, courts can and should 
consider the Copyright Office’s gloss on the concepts of “originality” and “creativity,” because 
courts rarely address those questions, but the Copyright Office decides them every day. As the 
Third Circuit observed in Southco v. Kanebridge, “the practice of the Copyright Office ‘reflects a 
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for 
guidance."4 
This Article argues that “registration is fundamental” because the considered opinions of 
the Copyright Office help courts better understand and decide questions of copyrightable subject 
matter. It begins by briefly explaining the history of copyright registration and its role in 
copyright ownership, culminating in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com. Then it explains the 
registration process, focusing on the originality, independent creation, and creativity 
requirements for copyrightable subject matter. It observes that if registration occurs when a 
copyright owner files a registration application, then rational copyright owners will not bother to 
register until they want to file an infringement action, and courts will lose the benefit of the 
Copyright Office’s insight. And then it demonstrates the value of that insight by providing a 
survey of selected Copyright Office Review Board Letters. The Appendix provides a table of all 
published Review Board letters, including a brief summary of the grounds for the Board’s 
decision. 
 
THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION 
 
When the United States created federal copyright protection, it also created federal 
copyright registration.5 Under the Copyright Act of 1790, federal copyright protection required 
                                                 
2 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-223). 
3 In 1870, the Library of Congress created a Copyright Department, which was the predecessor of the Copyright 
Office. Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, § 85 (1870). 
4 Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 286 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 4 
(2004)). 
5  See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 101.1 (3d ed. 2017) 
(hereinafter COMPENDIUM (THIRD)). See generally Zvi S. Rosen & Richard Schwinn, An Empirical Study of 225 
Years of Copyright Registrations (unpublished manuscript on file with IP Theory);  WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT 
LAW AND PRACTICE (1994).  
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registration with the clerk of a United States District Court.6 Accordingly, federal copyright 
registries were regional, and maintained by the various federal district courts.7 
The Copyright Act of 1831 retained the same regional registration system. 8  But the 
Copyright Act of 1870 centralized registration in the Library of Congress and required the 
Librarian of Congress to “make an annual report to Congress of the number and description of 
copyright publications for which entries have been made during the year.”9 The Librarian created 
a Copyright Department to administer copyright issues, including registration. And in 1874, the 
Library released its first set of guidelines for copyright registration.10 
Among other things, the Copyright Act of 1897 created the office of Register of 
Copyrights, to be appointed by the Librarian of Congress.11 In response, the Librarian created the 
Copyright Office, and appointed Thorvald Solberg the first Register of Copyrights. Solberg 
focused on improving the administration of copyright, including registration. For example, in 
1891, the Copyright Office began publishing the Catalog of Copyright Entries, as well as ever-
increasing amounts of copyright data. 
The Copyright Act of 1909 weakened the registration requirement for copyright 
ownership. Under the 1909 Act, federal copyright required publication with proper notice.12 
Unpublished works retained state copyright, but publication without proper notice forfeited both 
state and federal copyright.13 While the 1909 Act did not strictly require registration, it did 
require timely registration in order to file an infringement action or renew a federal copyright.14 
As a consequence, authors interested in copyright ownership typically registered their works. 
And the Copyright Act of 1976 made registration largely optional for copyright 
ownership. Under the 1976 Act, federal copyright only requires fixation of an original work of 
authorship in a tangible medium of expression. Renewal is unnecessary, and a copyright owner 
can register at any time. However, the 1976 Act does make registration a prerequisite for an 
infringement action.  
 
REGISTRATION UNDER THE 1976 ACT 
 
Under the 1976 Act, in order to register a copyright claim in a work of authorship, a 
copyright owner must submit a registration application to the Copyright Office.15 The application 
                                                 
6 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, § 1 (1790). The 1790 Act also required deposit of a printed copy of the 
work and notice of registration by publication. Id. § 3.  
7 Between 1790 and 1870, about 90% of registrations were made in New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. 
Zvi  & Schwinn, supra note 5.. 
8 Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436. The 1831 Act eliminated the notice by publication requirement but 
added a requirement to deposit copies of the work with the federal government. Id.  
9 Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, § 85. 
10 See Rosen & Schwinn, supra note 5. 
11 Copyright Act of 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481. 
12 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 § 9. 
13  Technically only general or “divestative” publication without notice forfeits copyright. While limited or 
“investative” publication with proper notice created federal copyright, limited publication without proper notice did 
not forfeit state copyright. 
14 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. 
15 A registration application consists of the completed application form, the requisite deposit copy or copies of the 
work, and the full filing fee. COMPENDIUM (THIRD), supra note 5, § 204. See also 17 U.S.C.A. § 409 (Westlaw 
through Pub. L. No. 115-223). The Office is currently undergoing a Modernization effort to make Registration an 
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is forwarded to the Registration Program, which assigns it to a registration specialist. The 
registration specialist will examine the application and determine whether the work constitutes 
copyrightable subject matter, and whether the application satisfies all of the legal and formal 
requirements for registration.16 
Examination may take as long as a year, but the majority of applications are processed in 
7 to 9 months.17 Under certain circumstances, including pending or prospective litigation, the 
applicant may request “special handling.” 18  If the Copyright Office grants the request, the 
applicant may expedite examination by paying an additional fee.19 The Copyright Office tries to 
process applications with approved special handling requests within five business days. 
If the work appears to constitute copyrightable subject matter, and the application 
satisfies the other requirements for registration, the Copyright Office will register the claim. 
Among other things, it will issue a certificate of registration and create an online public record. 
These will include a registration number and an effective date of registration, which is the date 
on which the Copyright Office received the complete application.20 
If the work does not appear to constitute copyrightable subject matter, or the application 
does not appear to satisfy the other requirements for registration, the Copyright Office will refuse 
to register the claim. The registration specialist assigned to the application will also specify the 
reasons for its decision in a letter ruling sent to the applicant. 21  Among other things, the 
Copyright Office may refuse to register a copyright claim if: 
 
● The application is incomplete. 
● The work is not fixed in a tangible medium. 
● The work lacks human authorship. 
● The work is not protected by the Copyright Act. 
● The work was not independently created. 
● The work lacks the minimum level of creative authorship required for copyright. 
● The work is in the public domain. 
● The applicant is not qualified to register a copyright claim in the work. 
● The work infringes an existing work. 
● The applicant failed to submit a copy of the work.22 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
easier, more straightforward process. See U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Modernization (Mar. 30, 2018), 
https://www.copyright.gov/copyright-modernization/.   
16COMPENDIUM (THIRD), supra note 5. 
17 Currently, the overwhelming majority of applications are processed in 7 to 9 months, but processing times have 
ranged from 2 months to 28 months. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REGISTRATION PROCESSING TIMES 1. 
18 COMPENDIUM (THIRD), supra note 5, § 207. According to the Copyright Office, it approves special handling 
requests “only in relation to [p]ending or prospective litigation, [c]ustoms matters, or [c]ontract or publishing 
deadlines that necessitate the expedited issuance of a certificate,” and only if “there is a compelling reason for the 
service.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 10: SPECIAL HANDLING 1 (2017). As a consequence, special handling 
requests are rarely approved. 
19 Currently, the special handling fee is $800 per claim. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT OFFICE FEES 2 (2016). 
20 COMPENDIUM (THIRD), supra note 5, § 209. 
21 Id. § 211. 
22 Id. § 1702. 
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When the Copyright Office refuses to register a copyright claim, the applicant may 
appeal to the Copyright Office. The first step in an administrative appeal is a first request for 
reconsideration, in which the applicant must explain why the application was improperly refused 
and pay a filing fee.23 The first request for reconsideration is reviewed de novo by a Registration 
Program staff attorney, who may either register the claim or uphold the refusal to register, ideally 
within four months. The Copyright Office will inform the applicant in writing of its decision to 
register the claim, or its reasons for upholding the refusal to register.24 
The next step in an administrative appeal is a second request for reconsideration, in 
which the applicant must explain why the application was improperly refused, specifically 
address the Copyright Office’s reasons for upholding the refusal to register in the first request for 
reconsideration, and pay a filing fee.25 The second request for reconsideration is reviewed de 
novo by the Copyright Office Review Board.26 A majority of the Review Board may either 
register the claim or uphold the refusal to register. The Review Board will inform the applicant 
in writing of its decision to register the claim, or its reasons for upholding the refusal to 
register.27 
The Review Board’s written response to a second request for reconsideration is a final 
agency action of the Copyright Office.28 Accordingly, the applicant may appeal the Review 
Board’s refusal to register under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) by filing an action 
against the Register of Copyrights in a federal district court.29 
The district court will review the Copyright Office’s refusal to register for “abuse of 
discretion.”30 In other words, the district court will defer to the Review Board’s findings of fact 
and will ask only whether the Review Board reasonably applied the controlling law to those 
facts. The district court’s review is limited to the administrative record, and it will reverse only if 
the Register’s decision does not reflect “reasoned decisionmaking.”31 Accordingly, the district 
court does not determine whether the work is protected by copyright, but only whether the 
Register reasonably refused to register the copyright claim. 
 
REGISTRATION & COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS 
 
Under Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act, copyright owners can file a copyright 
infringement action only if the Copyright Office has either registered or refused to register their 
copyright claim in the allegedly infringed work.32 If the Copyright Office refused to register the 
copyright claim, the copyright owner must serve a copy of the complaint on the Register of 
                                                 
23 Id. § 1703.1. 
24 Id. § 1703.2. 
25 Id. § 1704.1. 
26 The Register of Copyrights and the General Counsel of the Copyright Office may also designate representatives to 
serve on the Review Board. 
27 COMPENDIUM (THIRD), supra note 5, § 1704.2;see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 410 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 15-223). 
28 37 C.F.R. § 202.5(g) (2017). 
29 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 500–596 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-223).  
30 See, e.g., OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 
F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Under the APA, a court may set aside agency action where it is "arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A) (Westlaw 
through Pub. L. 115-223). 
31 Coach, Inc. v. Peters, 386 F. Supp. 2d 495, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
32 17 U.S.C.A. § 411 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-223). 
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Copyrights, who may join the action with respect to the question of the registrability of the 
claim.33 
The plaintiff in a copyright infringement action must prove ownership of a valid 
copyright in the allegedly infringed work. A certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of 
validity, but the defendant may rebut that presumption. By contrast, if the Copyright Office 
refused to register the copyright claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving validity. But in 
either case, the district court must independently determine whether the allegedly infringed work 
constitutes copyrightable subject matter.34 
However, district courts hearing copyright infringement actions tend to give some 
deference to the Copyright Office’s decision whether to register or refuse to register the 
plaintiff’s copyright claim in the allegedly infringed work.35 Specifically, they typically apply a 
version of Skidmore deference, and rely on the Copyright Office’s conclusions when they are 
persuasive.36 While district courts independently determine the validity of the copyright in an 
allegedly infringed work, in practice, they rarely disagree with the Copyright Office. 
 
FOURTH ESTATE V. WALL-STREET.COM 
 
On June 28, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in Fourth 
Estate v. Wall-Street.com, in order to determine whether Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act 
permits copyright owners to file an infringement action before the Copyright Office has acted on 
their registration application.37  
Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation (“Fourth Estate”) is a Delaware public benefit 
corporation that produces news articles, among many other things.38 Fourth Estate claims to own 
the copyrights in the articles it produces, and licenses those articles on a non-exclusive basis to 
                                                 
33 Id. 
34 See, e.g., I.C. ex rel. Solovsky v. Delta Galil USA, 135 F. Supp. 3d 196, 212–13 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“The Court 
must accordingly make an independent determination as to whether plaintiff's design is entitled to copyright 
protection.”); Ward v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 208 F. Supp. 2d 429, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (observing that “district 
courts must make independent determinations of copyright validity”). 
35 See, e.g., Norris Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1983) (“The district court 
properly gave some deference to the expertise of the Register in its decision.”); Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, 
Inc., 755 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 (9th Cir. 2014) (“When interpreting the Copyright Act, we defer to the Copyright 
Office's interpretations in the appropriate circumstances.”). 
36 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that, even when not controlling, agency 
decisions “do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly 
resort for guidance,” and that the “weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness 
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and 
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”);  Inhale, Inc., 755 F.3d at 1041–42 
(“Because Chevron deference does not apply to internal agency manuals or opinion letters, we defer to the 
Copyright Office's views expressed in such materials ‘only to the extent that those interpretations have the ‘power to 
persuade.’”) (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)); Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 
F.3d 276, 286 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We believe that the Copyright Office's longstanding practice of denying registration 
to short phrases merits deference.”); N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d 
527, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[C]ourts have found that the policies and 
interpretation of the Office are entitled to deference.”). 
37 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (Mem) (2018). 
38 See Mission and Vision, FOURTHESTATE, https://www.fourthestate.org/. Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation 
was formed on July 14, 2015. DIV. OF CORPS., DEL. SEC’Y OF STATE, FILE NUMBER 5785473. It registered to do 
business in Florida on July 21, 2015, but its registration was revoked for failure to file an annual report. DIV. OF 
CORPS., FLA.  SEC’Y OF STATE, DOCUMENT NUMBER F15000003173. 
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AHN Feed Syndicate (“Feed Syndicate”).39 Fourth Estate retains the copyright in the articles it 
licenses to Feed Syndicate, as well as the right to sue for copyright infringement. 40  Feed 
Syndicate licenses Fourth Estate’s articles to third-party subscribers for publication. Feed 
Syndicates license agreement with its subscribers provides, “Prior to account cancellation you 
must stop display of all Feed Syndicate provided content and permanently take down, remove 
and/or delete all cached, saved, archived, stored or databased content or data.”41  
Wall-Street.com, LLC (“Wall-Street.com”) is a Florida limited liability company owned 
by Jerrold D. Burden that operates a website offering financial news, among other things.42 On 
January 30, 2012, Wall-Street.com purchased a Feed Syndicate subscription, and published 
articles owned by Fourth Estate. At some point, Wall-Street.com canceled its Feed Syndicate 
subscription, but it did not remove 244 articles owned by Fourth Estate from its website.43 
When Fourth Estate learned that Wall-Street.com was publishing its articles without a 
license, it filed a copyright registration application for the 244 articles, and on March 11, 2016, it 
filed a copyright infringement action against Wall-Street.com and Burden in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida. In its complaint, Fourth Estate acknowledged 
that the Copyright Office had not yet registered or refused to register its copyright claims in the 
244 articles at issue. Fourth Estate stated, “Upon receipt of the registration certificate for these 
works, Fourth Estate will file this certificate with the court,” and noted that “when issued by the 
Register of Copyrights the registration certificate will be dated prior to the filing of this action.”44 
Wall-Street.com filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that under Section 
411 of the Copyright Act, copyright owners cannot file an infringement action until the 
Copyright Office has either registered or refused to register their copyright claim in the allegedly 
infringed work.45 The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint, holding that “a plaintiff 
must first obtain registration for the work at issue prior to initiating suit.” 46  Fourth Estate 
appealed to the United States Circuit Court for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed, holding that 
“registration occurs when the Register of Copyrights registers the claim.”47 And Fourth Estate 
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court of the United States granted.48  
 
SECTION 411(A) OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT & THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT 
 
Fourth Estate argues that Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act authorizes copyright 
owners to file an infringement action as soon as they have filed a registration application with the 
Copyright Office. Wall-Street.com responds that it does not authorize copyright owners to file an 
                                                 
39 See About, FEEDSYNDICATE, https://www.feedsyndicate.com/. 
40 Complaint at 2, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, L.L.C., No. 16-cv-60497 (S.D. Fla. 2016), 
2016 WL 5243636. 
41 Id. at 4. 
42 See WALL-STREET.COM, https://wall-street.com/. Wall-Street.com, LLC was formed on October 20, 2011. DIV. OF 
CORPS., FLA. SEC’Y OF STATE, DOCUMENT NUMBER L11000120164. 
43 Complaint, supra note 40, at 11–16; Brief of Appellant at 3, Fourth Estate, No. 16-cv-60497, 2016 WL 4524044. 
44 Complaint, supra note 40, at 4. 
45 Motion to Dismiss at 4, Fourth Estate, No 16-cv-60497, 2016 WL 5267218; see 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (Westlaw 
through Pub. L. No. 15-223). 
46 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, No. 16-60497-Civ-Scola, 2016 WL 9045625, at *1 (S.D. 
Fla. May 23, 2016). 
47 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, L.L.C., 856 F.3d 1338, 1339 (11th Cir. 2017). 
48 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, L.L.C., No. 17-571, 2018 WL 3148286, at *1 (U.S. June 28, 
2018). 
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infringement action until the Copyright Office has either registered or refused to register their 
copyright claim in the allegedly infringed work. 
Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act provides: 
 
[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall 
be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in 
accordance with this title. In any case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee 
required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and 
registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil action for 
infringement.49 
 
In Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, the Supreme Court held that the Section 411(a) 
registration requirement “is a precondition to filing a claim that does not restrict a federal court's 
subject-matter jurisdiction.” 50  But it did not opine on whether Section 411(a) requires 
registration or only application, and the various circuits disagree. The Tenth Circuit requires 
registration.51 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits require only application.52 The Eighth Circuit appears 
to require only application.53 The Seventh Circuit rule is unclear.54 And the First and Second 
Circuits have explicitly declined to adopt either rule.55 
The Eleventh Circuit had previously applied the registration rule in passing.56 But in 
Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com it explicitly adopted the registration rule, based on the plain 
text of the Copyright Act: “‘Registration of a copyright has not been made in accordance with 
title 17’ until ‘the Register registers the claim.’ Filing an application does not amount to 
registration.”57 Specifically, the court observed, “The Copyright Act defines registration as a 
process that requires action by both the copyright owner and the Copyright Office.”58 As a 
consequence, registration occurs when the Register of Copyrights registers a copyright claim, not 
when a copyright owner files a registration application. This is true even though the effective 
date of registration is ultimately the filing date. And the court noted, “If registration occurred as 
                                                 
49 17 U.S.C.A.§ 411(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 115-223). 
50 Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 157 (2010). 
51 See, e.g., La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1197 (10th Cir. 2005). 
52 See, e.g., Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 2010); Positive Black Talk Inc. 
v. Cash Money Records Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 365 (5th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 167; Apple 
Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386–87 (5th Cir. 1984). 
53 See, e.g., Action Tapes, Inc. v. Mattson, 462 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment for 
defendant because plaintiff failed to prove it filed a registration application before it filed its infringement action). 
54 Compare Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003) (requiring only application), 
with Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (requiring registration or refusal to register), and 
Brooks-Ngwenya v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch., 564 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 2009) (agnostic). 
55 Alicea v. Machete Music, 744 F.3d 773, 779 (1st Cir. 2014); Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120, 
125 (2d Cir. 2014). 
56 See M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1488–89 (11th Cir. 1990) (endorsing a district 
court’s dismissal of a copyright infringement action because the plaintiff had not obtained a certificate of 
registration); see also Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1302 n.8 (11th Cir. 2012) (observing that the 
Eleventh Circuit adopted the registration rule in M.G.B. Homes, 903 F.2d at 1488–89). 
57 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, L.L.C., 856 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting 17 
U.S.C.A. §§ 410(a), 411(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-223)). 
58 Id. at 1341. 
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soon as an application was filed, then the Register of Copyrights would have no power to “refuse 
registration.”59 
The circuits that have adopted the application rule have done so primarily on policy 
grounds.60 For example, the Ninth Circuit adopted the application rule because it “better fulfills 
Congress's purpose of providing broad copyright protection while maintaining a robust federal 
register.”61 Similarly, courts in the Fourth Circuit have observed that the registration rule would 
unfairly disadvantage copyright owners.62 
Fourth Estate relies primarily on policy arguments in favor of the application rule. While 
Fourth Estate makes pro forma arguments that the statutory text favors the application rule over 
the registration rule, its real argument is that the registration rule is unfair and inconsistent with 
the purpose of the Copyright Act. Implicit in Fourth Estate’s argument is that most copyright 
owners don’t bother filing registration applications until their works are infringed. The 
registration rule means that they have to wait for the Copyright Office to finish examining their 
application before they can file an infringement action. As a consequence, they may not be able 
to file an action and get an injunction for 6 months or more, unless they file a special handling 
request and the Copyright Office approves it. 
 
THE VALUE OF REGISTRATION 
 
Under the 1976 Act, copyright registration is literally a formality.63 While registration is 
a prerequisite for an infringement action, copyright owners can file an infringement action 
whether the Copyright Office registers or refuses to register their copyright claim. At most, 
registration only requires copyright owners to wait until the Copyright Office has acted. And 
sometimes they have to wait quite a while, as examination can take a year or more. For example, 
Fourth Estate’s registration application is still pending. 
Accordingly, opponents of the registration requirement argue that it is pointless and 
unfair. If copyright owners aren’t required to register in order to own a copyright, why should 
they have to register in order to file an infringement action? Registration is burdensome and 
expensive, especially if you own a lot of copyrighted works. Why shouldn’t copyright owners be 
able to wait and see if anyone infringes before registering? And why should they have to pay 
extra for expedited review? In addition, Michael Risch has asked whether the registration 
requirement presents an equal protection problem, given that domestic authors must register 
before filing an infringement action, but foreign authors need not.64 
                                                 
59 Id. 
60 Others have relied solely on Nimmer’s authority. See, e.g., Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386–
87 (5th Cir. 1984) (“In order to bring suit for copyright infringement, it is not necessary to prove possession of a 
registration certificate. One need only prove payment of the required fee, deposit of the work in question, and receipt 
by the Copyright Office of a registration application.”) (citing 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
7.16[B][1] (1978)). 
61 Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 2010). 
62 Secure Servs. Tech., Inc. v. Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 (E.D. Va. 1989) (“Were the 
law otherwise, the owner of a copyright would be left in legal limbo while the Copyright Office considers whether 
he qualifies for a certificate of registration.”). 
63 17 U.S.C.A. § 408(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-223) (“Registration Permissive”). 
64 See Michael Risch, The Real World Impact of the Copyright Registration Prerequisite, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION 
(July 30, 2018), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2018/07/the-real-world-impact-of-copyright.html; see also 
17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-223) (limiting application to “United States” works). 
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But formalities can be valuable, especially when they enable administrative review and 
encourage critical reflection. Indeed, as Maitland famously observed, "Substantive law is 
secreted in the interstices of procedure." 65  Even if registration is a formality, it may be a 
formality with teeth, because it requires the Copyright Office to provide a substantive review of 
the copyrightability of a work of authorship before the copyright owner can file an infringement 
action. The authors of works the Copyright Office refuses to register may decline to file 
infringement actions, reducing the caseload of the district courts. And if they do file infringement 
actions, the district court has the benefit of Copyright Office’s considered opinion on whether the 
work comprises copyrightable subject matter, among other things. 
 
THE SUBJECT MATTER OF COPYRIGHT 
 
While the Copyright Office considers many factors in determining whether a copyright 
claim qualifies for registration, the primary consideration is whether the work of authorship in 
question constitutes copyrightable subject matter. In order to make that determination, the 




“Originality” is the essence of copyright. The Supreme Court has long held that 
originality is the “sine qua non” of copyright and “a constitutional requirement” for copyright 
protection.67 Accordingly, copyright can only protect “original works of authorship,” and can 
only protect the original “elements” of a work of authorship. 
In Feist v. Rural (1991), the Supreme Court defined “originality,” holding that it requires 
both “independent creation” by the author of the work and “at least some minimal degree of 
creativity.”68 The Court explained that an element of a work is “independently created” by the 
author of the work so long as it was not “copied” from another work of authorship.69 As it 
observed, “Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely 
resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.”70 So, if 
two authors independently create identical works, copyright may protect both works 
independently. But copyright cannot protect “facts,” because they are not created by an author, 
but copied from the world.71  
                                                 
65 See FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (1909) (quoting HENRY SUMNER 
MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM (1883)). 
66 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-223) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with 
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, 
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device.”). 
67 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991) (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); The Trade-
Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879)). 
68 Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 345. 
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 347.  
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The Court also explained that “originality” requires “a modicum of creativity.”72 But it 
emphasized that the amount of “creativity” required for copyright protection is very small: “To 
be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The 
vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no 
matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”73  For example, while copyright cannot 
protect “facts,” it can protect a compilation of facts, but only if the selection, coordination, or 
arrangement of those facts displays “some minimal level of creativity.” 74  While even most 
compilations of facts are sufficiently “creative” for copyright protection: “There remains a 
narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be 
virtually nonexistent.”75 Specifically, the Court held that copyright cannot protect a white pages 
telephone directory, because the selection, coordination, and arrangement of the listings lacks 




Unfortunately, the Court’s explanation of the “creativity” requirement for copyright 
protection in Feist is almost entirely useless. It observed that a “mechanical or routine” or 
“entirely typical” element of a work is not “creative.”78 And it insisted that “an author who 
claims infringement must prove ‘the existence of . . . intellectual production, of thought, and 
conception.’”79 That is to say, there has to be something, rather than nothing. But what that 
special something might be is left unstated.80 
While the Court held that a whitepages telephone directory lacks the “modicum of 
creativity” required for copyright protection, it did not explain what qualities would qualify an 
element of a work for copyright protection. Indeed, it did not even explain what would 
differentiate a “creative” compilation of facts from one lacking in creativity. Perhaps the Court 
was invoking Justice Stewart’s admission that some qualities are hard to define, but easy to 
identify: “I know it when I see it.” 81  Or in the alternative, perhaps it was channeling 
Wittgenstein’s observation that subjective experience cannot be expressed: "Whereof one cannot 
                                                 
72 Id. at 346.  
73 Id. at 345 (quoting 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 2.01[A], [B] (1990)). 
74 Id. at 358.  
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 362.  
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Id. at 362 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59–60 (1884)). 
80  Interestingly, while some lower court opinions had previously held that “creativity” is a requirement for 
copyright, the Supreme Court did not explicitly incorporate or rely on their holdings. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. 
Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“The level of creativity necessary and sufficient for copyrightability has 
been described as ‘very slight,’ ‘minimal,’ ‘modest.’”); Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players 
Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 668 n.6 (7th Cir. 1986) (“A work is creative if it embodies some modest amount of intellectual 
labor.”); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (“The requirement of substantial as 
opposed to trivial variation and the prohibition of mechanical copying, both of which are inherent in and subsumed 
by the concept of originality, apply to both statutory categories. There is implicit in that concept a ‘minimal element 
of creativity over and above the requirement of independent effort.’”) (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, Nimmer on 
Copyright § 10.2). 
81 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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speak, thereof one must be silent."82 In any case, it had nothing further to say on the subject of 
creativity, and has said nothing since. 
Unsurprisingly, lower courts have struggled to apply the creativity requirement. They do 
not know what it requires and cannot even figure out what it means. So they tend to avoid it. 
Confronted with a threshold question of originality, courts typically conclude that the work at 
issue is sufficiently “creative” for copyright protection, but that the allegedly infringing work 
does not infringe, because it does not actually copy any original elements. 83  A wag might 
observe that copyright apparently protects everything but the white pages, but proving 
infringement is another matter entirely. 
In any case, lower courts rarely have occasion to address the creativity requirement. The 
overwhelming majority of works of authorship clearly qualify for copyright protection, so 
validity is simply not an issue. And the Copyright Office effectively weeds out many of the most 
marginal works by refusing to register them. While some applicants challenge the Copyright 
Office’s refusal to register, and others file infringement actions on the basis of its refusal to 




As a policy matter, the Court should interpret the Copyright Act to require the Copyright 
Office to determine whether to register a copyright claim before a copyright owner can file an 
infringement action, in order to ensure that courts have the benefit of the Copyright Office’s 
expertise. Unlike the courts, the Copyright Office has long experience in evaluating the 
originality of works of authorship and deep familiarity with the wide range of works claimed. 
Registration is the métier of the Copyright Office, in which it has developed a fluency that the 
courts conspicuously lack. Specifically, the Copyright Office has created a working definition of 
“creativity” on which courts can and do rely.  
 
Moreover, Congress expected and intended the courts to rely on the Copyright Office’s 
expertise. According to Congress, the registration requirement was intended to streamline 
copyright infringement litigation and keep marginal claims out of court.84 And as the Register of 
Copyrights has observed, “the registration process identifies unfounded claims and assists the 
courts in establishing presumptive facts and applying the law.”85 Similarly, the Department of 
Justice has recognized that one of the reasons for the registration requirement is to “afford courts 
the benefit of the Copyright Office’s expertise.”86 
Registration also provides at least some information about the salience of copyright 
protection. Under the 1909 Act, registration was important to copyright protection, and under 
earlier versions of the Copyright Act it was absolutely critical. Accordingly, registration strongly 
suggested that copyright was salient. 
                                                 
82 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS § 7.00 (1921). 
83 See, e.g., Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Satava possesses a thin copyright that protects 
against only virtually identical copying.”). 
84 See H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 41–42 (1988) (observing that registration “promotes efficient litigation practices” 
by discouraging frivolous claims). 
85 STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REP. OF THE REG. OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL 
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 75 (Comm. Print 1961). 
86 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) (No. 08-103), 
2009 WL 1601031. 
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By contrast, under the 1976 Act, copyright automatically protects all original works of 
authorship as soon as they are fixed in a tangible medium. As Brad Greenberg memorably 
observed, copyright is like an Oprah giveaway: (almost) everybody gets one.87 Registration is 
optional, unless a copyright owner wants to file an infringement action. And yet, many authors 
register, irrespective of infringement or even economic value. Presumably, copyright ownership 
is salient to registrants for a range of different reasons, some economic and some non-economic. 
Accordingly, registration still provides evidence about the salience of copyright that 
courts can use to inform their decisions about damages and copyright misuse. If the author of a 
work filed a copyright registration application prior to publication of the work, or prior to 
infringement of the work, it suggests that copyright in that work was salient to the author. And if 
an author programmatically files copyright registration applications for their work, it suggests 
that copyright protection is salient to that author’s business model. 
Of course, copyright can be salient to authors for many different reasons. For at least 
some authors, copyright is truly a quid pro quo that encourages them to produce works of 
authorship. Surely Samuel Johnson was not alone in believing, "No man but a blockhead ever 
wrote, except for money."88 For other authors, copyright is but one incentive among many. And 
for many authors, copyright is something they delegate to their agent. 
In addition, authors may value copyright for many different reasons. In theory, copyright 
law assumes that authors are rational economic actors, who value copyright as a way of 
internalizing the positive externalities associated with the works of authorship they create. But in 
practice, many authors view copyright as a way of controlling how people use the works of 
authorship they create. Different people may disagree about the justification for these desires. 
But from a consequentialist perspective, all of them may encourage authors to create works of 
authorship. 
 
THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE REVIEW BOARD 
 
In 1995, the Copyright Office created the Review Board to provide final agency review 
of registration applications. The Review Board consists of the Register of Copyrights and the 
General Counsel of the Copyright Office, or their respective designees, and a third person 
designated by the Register.89  The Review Board reviews the applicant’s second request for 
reconsideration de novo and issues a formal opinion letter, taking into consideration any prior 
correspondence between the complainant and the Office, matters known to the Office or the 
Review Board, and matters of general knowledge.90 While the decisions of the Review Board are 
final agency actions, they have no precedential value, although they may be reflect the Copyright 
                                                 
87 Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright and Trademark Troll: Fable or Fact?, at Chapman University School of Law, Law 
Review Symposium (Jan. 30, 2015) (Audio Recording 19:34–19:53),  
http://ibc.chapman.edu/Mediasite/Play/5fee649a60414522a5a1c1627f222ff81d.   
88 JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 731 (1791).  
89 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 20: REQUESTS FOR RECONSIDERATION (2017) (hereinafter CIRCULAR 20). The 
third person is often the director of a different division of the Copyright Office, such as the Office of Public 
Information and Education.  
90 Id.; see also 37 C.F.R. § 202.5 (2017) (“(4) If the Review Board decides to register an applicant's work in 
response to a second request for reconsideration, it will notify the applicant in writing of the decision and the work 
will be registered. If the Review Board upholds the refusal to register the work, it will send the applicant a written 
notification stating the reasons for refusal.”). 
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Office’s understanding of the Copyright Act and judicial opinions interpreting the Copyright 
Act.91 
Historically, Copyright Office registration decisions were non-public. From 1995 to 
2015, the University of New Hampshire obtained registration decisions by filing Freedom of 
Information Act requests and published them on its website.92  And then in June 2017, the 
Copyright Office began publishing Review Board opinion letters on its website, in order to help 
provide additional guidance to those undergoing the registration process.93 
Each letter maintains the same structure: 1) a brief description of the work; 2) a 
procedural history; 3) a standardized legal framework, tailored to the work at issue; and 4) 
analysis of the Work itself. The legal framework consists of principles derived from case law 
(primarily Feist,94 Atari Games,95 Coach, Inc.,96 Satava,97 and Bleistein98), as well as relevant 
sections of the Compendium. 
There are four main categories of refusals: useful articles/separation, idea/expression 
dichotomy, lack of creativity, and derivative works. Many works fall into multiple categories, 
and as a result, the Board often has to go through multiple analyses in its deliberations.99 While 
the Board is able to offer helpful observations about each category, we will only be discussing 
originality/creativity as a representative sample.  
One of the most common grounds for affirming the refusal to grant registration is on the 
basis that the Works do not “contain a sufficient amount of original and creative artistic or 
graphic authorship to sustain a claim in copyright.”100 
 
REVIEW BOARD LETTER RULINGS 
 
Based on the available letters, the Board is more likely to reverse the decision to refuse 
copyright registration if the Board has categorized the Work as “text” rather than any other 
category of work.101 Of the twenty decisions the Board has reversed, nine have been categorized 
                                                 
91 CIRCULAR 20, supra note 89.   
92 U.S. Copyright Board of Appeals Decisions https://www.ipmall.info/content/us-copyright-office-board-appeals-
decisions.  
93  See United States Copyright Office, Review Board Letters Online, https://www.copyright.gov/rulings-
filings/review-board/; see also George Thuronyi, Copyright Office Launches Online Database of Review Board 
Decisions (June 2, 2017), https://blogs.loc.gov/copyright/2017/06/copyright-office-launches-online-database-of-
review-board-decisions/. The oldest Review Board opinion letters currently published on the Copyright Office 
website were issued in April 2016. 
94 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
95 Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
96 Coach, Inc. v. Peters, 386 F. Supp. 2d 495, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
97 Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
98 Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
99 For example, in deciding whether or not the raised designs in a plastic floor liner for a car was eligible for 
copyright protection, the Board utilized the guidelines set out in Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. 1002 
(2017), to find the designs separable from the utility of the floor liner. The Board further found that "[t]he decorative 
pattern is a separable, non-useful work; the embossed design contains sufficient creative expression to be 
copyrightable under Feist." See  Letter from U.S. Copyright Office Review Board to Lawrence Ashery (April 19, 
2018).  
100 See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Copyright Office to Lisa Mottes (May 25, 2018).  
101 Categories include: architectural works, choreography, common shapes/symbols/designs, compilation, computer 
program, deposit, derivative work, human authorship, idea/expression dichotomy, jewelry design, labels and logos, 
layout and format, musical work, originality, other, rule of doubt, sound recording, text, textiles, three-dimensional 
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as “text.” 102  A particularly illuminative example of the Board’s analysis regarding 
originality/creativity is the A LITTLE BIT BAD Blog Content, Brady Joke.  
 
A. TEXTUAL WORKS 
 
In this appeal, referred to as Tom Brady Joke, the Board reversed the refusal to register 
the copyright claim in the work.103 The Work was described as “two-sentence textual work” and 
reads: “Tom Brady said he wants to give his MVP truck to the man who won the game for the 
Patriots. So enjoy that truck, Pete Carroll.”104 The Board noted that it based its finding on on the 
“minimal degree of creativity” requirement laid out in Feist.105 The Board stated that Courts and 
the Copyright Office have found copyright protection for jokes when the jokes are sufficiently 
creative, then cited to a Northern District of Georgia opinion, where the court found that a series 
of “You might be a redneck if . . . ” jokes “evidenced a modicum of intellectual labor” and 
therefore were eligible for copyright protection.106  
In finding that the Work was sufficiently creative, the Board cautioned that the copyright 
in the Work is “thin,” and that works with “thin” copyright “reflect only scant creativity.” The 
Board’s decision to grant thin copyright protection in Tom Brady Joke is consistent with a 
decision from the Southern District of California, which held that “there is little doubt that the 
jokes at issue merit copyright protection” but “the jokes here are similarly constrained by their 
subject matter and the conventions of the two-line, setup-and-delivery paradigm.”107 
This decision demonstrates how the Board uses case law to inform its ultimate decision. 
In utilizing both Foxworthy and Kaseberg, the Board was able to apply similar reasoning to the 
cases to come to a decision. The Board knew that jokes were eligible for protection, and this 
work was longer than a simple word or phrase.108 Relying on the Foxworthy court’s decision, the 
Board applied the legal standard “a modicum of intellectual labor” to the joke in front of them. In 
making that determination, the Board likely applied the logic in Kaseberg and asked whether or 
not the joke was derived from elements in the public domain. Presumably finding it was not, the 
Board found the work was eligible for “thin” copyright protection. This means that while the 
exact Work is protected, jokes about Tom Brady, Pete Carroll, or the Superbowl game in 
question will likely not be considered infringing.  
 
B. “STANDARD” WORKS AND COMPILATIONS 
 
In contrast, the Board often refuses to grant registration to a work for a number of 
reasons, including representational works, works that “are not the product of creative choice,” 
                                                                                                                                                             
work, two-dimensional work, typography, useful article, words and short phrases. Categories have been derived 
from the Copyright Office’s database of Review Board letters. See U.S. Copyright Office, Review Board Letters 
Online, (2018), https://www.copyright.gov/rulings-filings/review-board/.   
102 Here, a textual work is either a computer software, a traditional “literary work,” or a mobile application. See, e.g., 
Letter from U.S. Copyright Office Review Board to Mehrnaz Boroumand Smith (May 4, 2017); Letter from U.S. 
Copyright Office Review Board to Mark A. Fowler (June 30, 2016). 
103 Letter from U.S. Copyright Office Review Board to Jayson M. Lorenzo (July 27, 2017).  
104 Id.  
105 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).  
106 Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200, 1219 (N.D. Ga. 1995).  
107 Kaseberg v. Conaco, LLC., 260 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1245 (S.D. Cal. 2017). 
108 Words and phrases are not eligible for copyright protection. See 37 C.F.R. 202.1(a) (2018).  
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works comprising of primarily geometric shapes, and works whose compilations are not 
sufficiently creative.  
The Board is often faced with works that look similar to something found in nature, or 
something that is seen as “standard.” While “standard” is never defined, it is used in a variety of 
contexts, such as the cut of a diamond,109 the design of a logo,110 and the layout of a commercial 
label.111 In cases of this nature, the Board often applies the holding of Satava v. Lowry112 to the 
particular facts.  




In Log Cabin, the work in question is a sculpture, comprised of logs and wood 
components, “arranged to look like the facade of a log cabin.”113 The Review Board denied the 
complainant’s appeal due to lack of originality, pointing out that the log cabin sculpture “is a 
simple representation of a standard log cabin facade with joinery; thus any authorship is de 
minimus and does not support registration.”114 The Board specifically refused to consider the 
author’s conceptual choices when producing the Work, following Bleistein.115  
Bleistein teaches that “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to 
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the 
                                                 
109  Letter from U.S. Copyright Review Board to Howard Rockman (Mar. 20, 2017) (“Given the deposited material, 
the Board cannot examine . . . structural and faceting differences between the Work and the standard round brilliant 
cut.”). 
110  Letter from U.S. Copyright Review Board to Scott Warner (Dec. 12, 2017) (“To the contrary, the basic 
physiological characteristics of animals are considered ‘standard, stock, or common’ and are not protectable by 
copyright.”) (citing Alpi Intn’l, Ltd. v. Anga Supply, LLC, No. 13-cv-4888, 2015 WL 2170040, *3 (N.D. Cal. May 
8, 2015)); see also Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987) (in an infringement case concerning 
stuffed dinosaur toys, a court “prevent[ed] reliance upon any similarity in expression resulting from . . . the 
physiognomy of dinosaurs” because to do so would protect the idea of a dinosaur).    
111 Letter from U.S. Copyright Review Board to Jennette Wiser (Jan. 24, 2017) (“Similarly, the kosher certification, 
as a standard food label, is not copyrightable.”) [hereinafter Cod Liver]. 
112 323 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[E]xpressions that are standard, stock, or common to a particular subject 
matter or medium are not protectable under copyright law.”).  
113 Letter from U.S. Copyright Office Review Board to Andrew Epstein 4 (May 25, 2018) [hereinafter Log Cabin].  
114 Id.  
115 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).  
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narrowest and most obvious limits.”116 The court in Bleistein found that the appellants were 
entitled to copyright protection.  
Log Cabin is an interesting appeal because it involves a work of sculptural design. Works 
of “three-dimensional artwork” are often refused for lack of creativity,117 and in refusing works, 
the Board has had to determine what “the narrowest and most obvious limit” truly means. Log 
Cabin demonstrates the principle that simply copying a standard design does not meet the 
minimum threshold for creativity, largely because the idea is a standard expression. The 
Compendium instructs that, “the Office cannot register a claim based solely on standard 
expressions that naturally follow from the idea for a work of authorship.”118 This guidance is 
derived from Satava,119 which is utilized in each Review Board letter that discusses creativity 
and originality. 
The Board quotes Satava at length in explaining what the requisite level of creativity 
necessary to warrant protection is: 
 
It is true, of course, that a combination of unprotectable elements may qualify for 
copyright protection. But it is not true that any combination of unprotectable elements 
automatically qualifies for copyright protection. Our case law suggests, and we hold 
today, that a combination of unprotectable elements is eligible for copyright protection 
only if those elements are numerous enough and their selection and arrangement original 




This principle and corresponding language is demonstrated in Cod Liver.121 In Cod Liver, 
the Review Board refused to register a design for Cod Liver packaging artwork. This decision 
was made consistent with the ruling of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New 
                                                 
116 Id. at 251.  
117 See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Copyright Office Review Board to Michael Frodsham (Oct. 13, 2016); Satava v. 
Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
118 COMPENDIUM (THIRD), supra note 5, § 313.3(B).  
119 Satava, 323 F.3d at 811.  
120 Id. 
121 Cod Liver, supra note 111. 
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York, which found that the work was not copyrightable.122 The Board refused to register the 
Work because “[s]everal of the Work’s design elements are dictated by non-creative 
considerations or are mandated by government rules, including the nutritional facts, the UPC 
code, the manufacturing information, and the kosher certification.”123 The Board also noted that 
“the choice of using the colors of the Icelandic flag for a product imported from Iceland is not 
creative, nor is using a simple ocean wave design on the bottom of a can of fish. These are 
standard design elements that Interpage cannot claim.”124 The Board ultimately stated, “[i]n sum, 
the selection and placement of the Work’s elements are not the product of a creative choice, but 
are typical of commercial labels.”125  
 
C. UNUSUAL CATEGORIES: ARCHITECTURE AND CHOREOGRAPHY 
 
 
                                                 
122 Threeline Imps., Inc. v. Vernikov, 239 F. Supp. 3d 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). The court dismissed the defendant’s 
copyright infringement claim.   
123 Cod Liver, supra note 111, at 4.  
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
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The Review Board can also guide courts in determining whether a work from an atypical 
category, such as architecture or choreography, meets the creativity/originality requirement. In 
Dubai Frame, the Board affirmed the denial of registration of a rectangular-framed permanent 
building because “the Work essentially is a giant rectangular outline, a common geometric 
shape.”126  
In its second appeal, the author argued that the Work should constitute an “architectural 
work” under the Copyright Act because it was “designed for human occupancy,” and it included 
original design elements (such as form, height, and location), which are “creative and not 
functionally required.”127 The Board reversed its initial finding that the Work does not constitute 
an architectural work. Thus, the Board had to undertake a two-step analysis that asked “whether 
there are original design elements present, including the overall shape and interior architecture” 
and “[i]f such design elements are present, whether the design elements are functionally 
required.”128 
The author argued that the Work was sufficiently original “since, in ‘serv[ing] as a 
viewing point for other landmarks in Dubai,’ it includes original design elements (such as form, 
height, and location), which are creative and not functionally required.”129 However, the Board 
                                                 
126 Letter from U.S. Copyright Office Review Board to Edward Klaris 5 (Nov. 29, 2017) [hereinafter Dubai Frame].  
127 Id. at 2 (citing Letter from Ivan Proctor, Registration Specialist, to Edward Klaris (Nov. 21, 2016)).  
128 Dubai Frame, supra note 126 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20-21 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6935, 6950. 
129 Dubai Frame, supra note 126, at 2 (citing Letter from Ivan Proctor, Registration Specialist, to Edward Klaris 
(Nov. 21, 2016)).  
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rejected this argument, stating, “the Work, externally, is exactly the kind of geometric shape that 
belongs squarely within the public domain.”130 
Dubai Frame is an excellent example of the relationship the Copyright Office has with 
the court system. The Board supported their decision using Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty 
Food Corps.131 In Kitchens of Sara Lee, the Second Circuit found that the scope of Sara Lee’s 
copyright over the packaging of their cakes did not extend to “circular and rectangular 
shapes.”132 The court in Kitchens of Sara Lee relied on a publication by the Copyright Office, 
which spelled out what was appropriate for copyright registration, “The Copyright Office does 
not regard as sufficient to warrant copyright registration ‘familiar symbols or designs, mere 
variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or coloring, and mere listings of ingredients or 
contents.”133 The court specifically pointed out although that the publication “does not have the 
force of statute,”134 it was a “fair summary of the law.”135 Returning to Dubai Frame, the Board 
stated that “[t]he Work as a whole… does not satisfy even the low threshold for creativity set 
forth in Feist.”136  
Architecture is not the only unique category of registration that the Review Board has 
provided guidance for. In Five-Petal Flower, the Board refused registration for a “14-second 
video recording in which human silhouettes appear against a blue screen.”137 The Board, in 
laying out the law regarding subject matter copyright, the Board utilized both the Compendium, 
and prior case law. Primarily, the Board used Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc.,138 which held that 
“individual [dance] steps [] may be utilized as the choreography’s basic material in much the 
same way that words are the writer’s basic material.”139 
After finding that the individual movements collectively resulted in a de minimus 
choreography routine, The Board then had to determine “whether the combination of the static 
portrayals and performative movements result in copyrightable choreography.”140 The Board 
found that while combinations of multiple movements may satisfy the requirement for 
copyrightable authorship if they are arranged in a creative matter, the collection and arrangement 
here are insufficient to enable copyright registration.  
In Five Petal Flower, the Board heavily relied on the application of the Compendium to 
make its determination. Regarding copyrightability of choreography, the Board indicated that 
because “[i]ndividual dance steps and short dance routines are the building blocks of 
choreographic expression, and allowing copyright protection for these elements would impede 
rather than foster creative expression.”141 This quotation, while found in the Compendium, cites 
Horgan. Five Petal Flower demonstrates how the Copyright Office is able to take guidance from 
                                                 
130 Dubai Frame, supra note 126, at 5 (citing COMPENDIUM (THIRD), supra note 5, § 906.1); see also Kitchens of 
Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1959). 
131 266 F.2d at 545 (2d Cir. 1959).  
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 544 (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT OFFICE PUBLICATION, NO. 46 (1958).  
134 Kitchens of Sara Lee, 266 F.2d at 544.  
135 Id. 
136 Dubai Frame, supra note 126 (citing COMPENDIUM (THIRD), supra note 5, § 906.1); see also Kitchens of Sara 
Lee, 266 F.2d at 545. 
137 Letter from U.S. Copyright Office Review Board to Puo-I “Bonnie” Lee (July 14, 2016).  
138 789 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1986). 
139 Id. at 161.  
140 Letter from U.S. Copyright Office Review Board to Puo-I “Bonnie” Lee 4 (July 14, 2016).   
141 COMPENDIUM (THIRD), supra note 5, § 805.5(A) (citing Horgan, 789 F.2d at 161). 
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the court and expand on it, for the benefit of not only those applying for copyright protection, but 
for courts as well.  
 
D. LOGOS  
 
Works categorized as “logos” are commonly evaluated by the Board to determine if they 
meet the requisite level of creativity and originality. One-fifth of the Review Board letters 
concern logos or labels. Decisions regarding logos are often extremely fact-specific. Two 
decisions are particularly relevant: American Airlines and Blade Piercing Skin.      
 
 
In American Airlines, the Review Board refused to grant the American Airlines flight 
symbol copyright protection because the Work did not “contain the requisite separable 
authorship necessary to sustain a claim to copyright.”142 The Board noted that the Work is made 
of basic geometric shapes, uses “exceedingly common” coloring, and “to the extent the Work 
evokes an airplane wing or bird design, that does not propel the design into the range of 
copyrightability.” 
American Airlines argued that “courts have protected works consisting of unprotectable 
elements that result in creative abstractions or representations.” While the Board agreed with this 
notion, it nevertheless refused to grant registration because the Work “does not rise to the 
admittedly low level of creativity required by the Copyright Act.” The Board primarily relied on 
Atari Games in making this decision, noting that the court “accept[ed] the Register’s assertion 
that the individual graphic elements of each screen . . . are not copyrightable.”143  
This decision highlights the interplay between the courts and the Copyright Office. In 
Atari Games, the court relied on the Register’s determination that individual graphic elements on 
each screen of a video game were not copyrightable subject matter.144 The Review Board, in 
turn, has relied on this decision to refuse registration for a number of logos, including Blade 
Piercing Skin.  
In Blade Piercing Skin, the Board refused to register a logo consisting of three design 
elements: 
                                                 
142 Letter from U.S. Copyright Office Review Board to Andrew J. Avsec 4 (Jan. 8, 2018).  
143 Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  
144 Id. 
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The Board found that none of the elements, alone, were sufficiently creative to merit 
copyright protection. The Board relied heavily on the Compendium, which notes that typeface, 
or mere variations thereof, is not subject to copyright protection.145 More notably, the Board 
found that “the combination of the “C” and “T” elements together” is a “common design feature 
in logos, found in the Chicago Cubs, Comedy Central, CNN, and Federal Communications 
Commission logos, among others” and was thus not eligible for copyright protection. The Board 
highlights many cases where these logos were not found to merit copyright protection, including 
Coach, Inc. v. Peters.146 
The Board relies heavily on Coach, Inc. in letters regarding logos. Coach, Inc. was the 
result of an administrative appeal to the decision of the Board. The court upheld the Copyright 
Office’s decision, finding that the Register’s decision regarding the copyrightability of a Work is 
entitled to “a significant degree of deference”147 Further, the court noted that there was not any 
authority that would allow the court, under APA review, to order defendant to register the Works 
at issue.148 Regardless, the court found that the Office did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in 
refusing to register the Work at issue.  
 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF COPYRIGHT REVIEW BOARD DECISIONS 
 
The Copyright Act dictates that the actions of the Register of Copyrights are subject to 
review under the Administrative Procedure Act.149 Under the APA, “the court shall review the 
whole record or those parts of it cited by a party” to determine if the agency acted in an arbitrary 
and capricious manner.150 There are three major court opinions that review the actions of the 
Copyright Review Board: People Pleaser, Joe Unleaded, and Cod Liver. While Joe Unleaded 
and Cod Liver are important in their own right, People Pleaser is much more relevant in 
determining how the Office determines something is sufficiently creative for copyright 
protection. 
 
                                                 
145 COMPENDIUM (THIRD), supra note 5, § 913.1 (“Copyright Office cannot register a claim to copyright in typeface 
or mere variations of typographic ornamentation or lettering, regardless of whether the typeface is commonly used 
or truly unique.”). 
146 386 F. Supp. 2d 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  
147 Homer Laughlin China Co. v. Oman, No. 90-3160, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10680, at *3 (D.D.C. July 30, 1991).  
148 Coach, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d at 497 (citing Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  
149 17 U.S.C.A. § 701(e) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-223) (“. . . [A]ll actions taken by the Register of 
Copyrights under this title are subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.”). 
150 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-223).  




In Ashton v. United States Copyright Office, plaintiff submitted an application to the U.S. 
Copyright Office to register a hand-painted coffee mug titled “People Pleaser” as both a two-
dimensional visual artwork and as a literary work.151 The Office registered Plaintiff’s copyright 
in the visual artwork on the mug, but found that the work “lacked the creativity necessary for 
copyright as a literary work.” The Office refused to register the work as a literary work three 
separate times. The Plaintiff then sued the Copyright Office under the Administrative Procedure 
Act. Both parties filed Motions for Summary Judgment.  
Plaintiff argued that the Work constituted a literary work consisting of three phrases: 
“People Pleaser in Recovery”; “Refill”; and the raised middle finger as a pictogram. Plaintiff 
argued that the three phrases combined reach the “requisite minimum degree of creativity to 
merit copyright protection.”152 Plaintiff also argued that Feist v. Rural Telephone Inc. does not 
supply the relevant standard for “creativity,” because that case “pertains to whether a compilation of 
data possesses sufficient creativity to merit copyright protection,” whereas his work is a poem.153 
The Copyright Office argued that its refusal was “wholly appropriate, justified by 
existing law and practices.” 154  The Office argued that short phrases categorically lack the 
minimum level of creativity that the Constitution requires of works subject to copyright. Further, 
the Office stated that “[s]ince at least 1899, it has been the practice of the Copyright Office to 
                                                 
151 Ashton v. United States Copyright Office, 310 F. Supp. 3d 149 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2018). 
152 Id. at 154. 
153 Id. at 159.  
154 Brief for United States Copyright Office at 6, Ashton v. U.S. Copyright Office, 310 F. Supp. 3d 149 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 8, 2018).   
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deny registration to ‘words and phrases’ because they lack the de minimis creative expression 
required to be protected by copyright.”155 
 
The court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted Office’s cross-
motion for summary judgment, finding no “clear error of judgment” in the Office’s decision that 
combined elements of plaintiff’s Work are not sufficiently creative to receive copyright 
protection.156 The court pointed out that “[w]ithout question, the creativity standard articulated in 
Feist is applicable here” and noted that “[t]hough the bar is low, not every work that exhibits 




The best reading of the text of the Copyright Act requires the Copyright Office to decide 
a copyright registration application before the applicant can file an infringement action. And that 
is as it should be. The Copyright Office can help courts evaluate the copyrightability of works 
more effectively and provide context for their decisions on copyrightability. In addition, the 
Copyright Office brings long experience with the evaluation of the copyrightability of works of 
authorship to the table. 
While Copyright Review Board letter rulings are non-precedential and do not bind courts, 
they give courts access to the Copyright Office’s expertise in evaluating the eligibility of works 
of authorship for copyright protection. In particular, they provide useful examples of how the 
Copyright Office reviews the “originality” of works of authorship for the purpose of copyright 
protection, including a valuable gloss on the “creativity” requirement adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Feist v. Rural. 
If the courts disagree with the Copyright Office’s interpretation of the requirements for 
copyright protection, they can correct it. But courts can also learn from the expertise of the 
Copyright Office. The Supreme Court should interpret the registration requirement of the 




                                                 
155 Id. 
156 Ashton, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 160.  
157 Id. at 159.  




Title Year Categories Brief Reasoning Outcome 







Simple combinations of basic geometric 
shapes and mere variations of 
coloration. Work is different than 
examples given in Compendium 
because this is an “obvious buffalo 
check or plaid arrangement.” Symbolic 
meaning or impression a work convrys 
is irrelevant. Mere simplistic 
arrangement of non-protectable 
elements is inappropriate. 
Refusal 
Affirmed 






dimensional artwork; Labels 
and logos; Originality 
The overall shape has familiar features 
in Greek pottery. Contributions 
modifying this standard shape are de 
minimus. Office does not compare 
works that have been previously 










dimensional artwork; Labels 
and logos; Originality 
Does not contain requisite authorship 
because there are standard geometric 
shapes and colors that do not 
individually qualify for copyright 
protection. Specific design choices do 
not matter. Similar works registered do 
not matter. Combination is not enough 
because the logo is a mere variation of a 
standard map pointer vector. 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
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dimensional artwork; Labels 
and logos; Originality; Text; 
Typography; Words and short 
phrases 
Work is mere variation of typographic 
ornamentation, lettering, or coloring. No 
argument that there is creative 






dimensional artwork; Labels 
and logos; Originality 
The work does not contain the requisite 
authorship. Elements of the work are 
variations of geometric shapes. Simple 
arrangement of unprotectable elements 








dimensional artwork; Labels 
and logos; Originality 
Lacks requisite creativity because the 
work consists of minor variations on 
geometric shapes arranged in a 
predictable manner. Combined work not 
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dimensional artwork; Labels 
and logos; Originality 
Work is a useful article; no requisite 
authorship. Fails a creativity test 
because there are familiar symbols and 
designs and common geometric shapes. 










dimensional artwork; Labels 
and logos; Originality 
Basic geometric shapes, de minimus 
overall design, "individual elements are 
merely placed to conform to the 
circumference of a circle," no color 









dimensional artwork; Layout 
and format; Originality 
Combination of words, simple shapes, 
basic color schemes; Number of choices 
an author makes in combining simple 
shapes, fonts, and colors must be 
"sufficiently high" and that threshold 
isn't met here. Various shapes not 
arranged in a random pattern-- this 
consists of horizontal text within and 
under a red banner; It is novel and 









No "original and creative artistic 
or graphic authorship"; 
authorship is "de minimus"; 
standard design elements 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
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No "original and creative artistic or 
graphic authorship"; standard design 












Not sufficiently creative; the 
arrangement of uncopyrightable 
elements; simple geometric 
designs arranged in an obvious 











three dimensional artwork 
Useful article; de minimus 
amount of creative expression; 
not sufficiently creative; use of 
uncopyrightable elements; minor 
authorial discretion; creative 
authorship "de minimus" 
Refusal 
Affirmed 




Raised, decorative pattern of 
various shapes, separable and 











Not sufficiently creative; trivial 










Meets standard set forth in Star 
Athletica; separable elements 




LIV Logo 2018 
Originality, Two-
dimensional artwork, 
Labels and Logos, Text, 
Typography, Words and 
short phrases 
Doesn't meet creative authorship; 
doesn't rise to level of creativity; 
trivial variations; typeface; de 
minimus; common arrangement 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
2018] REGISTRATION IS FUNDAMENTAL 29 
Title Year Categories Brief Reasoning Outcome 
ZX2 
Yampa/Light 










Satisfies requirement of creative 
authorship, but combination of 
elements is derivative. Yampa is 
registered, Updraft is not. 
Refusal 
Affirmed 





Lacks sufficient creativity; minor 
variation on common shapes; 
trivial variation on a basic design; 













Does not contain requisite 
authorship; combination of 
common geometric shapes; 
combination of shapes doesn't 









Labels and logos, 
Originality, Two-
dimensional artwork 
Work as not separable; basic 









Labels and logos, 
Originality, Two-
dimensional work 
Exceedingly simplistic; familiar 
shape or design; animal 
pshysiology are considered 
"standard, stock, or common"; 









Text, Words and short 
phrases 
Works are derivative of 2015 
Ratings Plan; fail to demonstrate 
sufficent creativity; merger 
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Title Year Categories Brief Reasoning Outcome 
HQ Artwork 
(unpublished) 







Derivative authorship as trivial; 
authorship as not creative; 
preexisting design elements not 
utilized in a creative manner 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
STORY Logo 2017 
Originality, Two-
dimensional artwork, 
Labels and logos, Text, 
Typography, Words and 
short phrases 
Fails to satisfy requirement of 
creative authorship; Simplistic 
arrangement of non-protectable 
elements does not demonstrate 
the level of creativity necessary 
to warrant protection; CO do not 
make aesthetic judgments in 
evaluating copyrightability 
(Bleistein); trivial variation on 







Useful article, Derivative 
work 
Overall presence and placement 
of preexisting design elements is 
sufficiently creative. Thin 
copyright protection granted. 
Refusal 
Reversed 





"does not explain how the Work 
is more than an uncopyrightable, 
slavish copy of the necessary 
compressor-section components 
of actual turbocharger"; 
incorporates only the minimum 
basic elements necssary to 
replicate a miniature 
turbocharger; no creative 
authorship; no elements beyond 
predictable incorporation of stock 
features; combination as 
"mechanical or routine" (Feist) 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
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Title Year Categories Brief Reasoning Outcome 
Joe Unleaded, 
Joe Tall Dark 
and Handsome, 





Labels and logos 











Staggered Carbon: different 
textures of bands and 
arrangement exhibits 
copyrightable authorship. 
Specific combination of textures 
protected, not woven patterns or 
carbon fiber apperances 
generally. gold wood: lacks 
sufficient creativity; consists of 
minor variations on common 
shapes arranged in an obvious 
manner; very few elements; "de 













Work incorporates significant 
portions of preexisting and 
widely published, copyrighted 
work (Tetris). yikes. No 
independent authorship. De 
minimus minor design 
differences between borders used 








Geometric shapes; standard 
designs and shapes; not original 




 IP THEORY [Vol. 8:1 32 






Labels and logos, 
Originality, Two-
dimensional artwork 
None of the Work's elements are 
subject to copyright protection; 
inconsequential differences 
(sharp edges or tapering and 
rounded edges); familiar symbols 
= de minimus amount of 
expression; not sufficiently 
creative overall: nestling the 
letter C is a common design 






Labels and logos, 
Originality, Text, Two-
dimensional artwork, 
Typography, Words and 
short phrases 
Work doesn't rise to level of 
creativity; de minimus quantum 
of creativity; mostly text or 
typography; registration decisions 









Typography, Words and 
short phrases 
Traditional sports idiom/short 
phrase; familiar elements; Work 
falls below threshold of creativity 
Refusal 
Affirmed 







elements doesn't necessarily 
result in copyrightable design; 
Simple shape in jewelry design; 
contributions as de minimus and 










Work combines multiple 
geometric shapes into a design 
that illustrates creative choice in 
the positioning of the shapes in 
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Title Year Categories Brief Reasoning Outcome 
Trilliane Strand 2017 
Three-dimensional 
artwork, Useful article, 
Originality 
Work meets separability test; 3D 
design of numerous crystals of 
various shapes and sizes in an 
original arrangement is an artistic 
feature; combination of different 
sized octagons and pendaloques 
in crystal crown and stand (as a 






artwork, Useful article, 
Originality 
Separable; 3D design of metal 
mesh interspersed with crystles is 
artistic feature; intricate crystle 




A LITTLE BIT 
BAD, Blog 
Content, Brady 
Joke February 3, 
2015 
2017 
Originality, Text, Words 
and short phrases 
Thin copyright granted; 
organization of elements of the 










Labels and logos, Layout 
and format 
Thin copyright granted; Work 
consists of multiple design 
elements that put together are 











Words and short phrases, 
Compilation, Labels and 
logos, Typography 
Not sufficiently creative; 
standard font, spacing, colors for 
signs (not product of creative 
choice); combination of elements 
not creative (choices dictated by 
industry guidelines and practice); 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
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Words and short phrases 
"Sufficient, although minimal, 
amount of original and creative 
two-dimensional artwork 
authorship." Thin copyright 




TBPF16 1(3d) 2017 
Three-dimensional 
artwork, Originality, 
Jewelry design, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Uncommon shapes and designs. 
Refusal 
Reversed 








Elements are "merely common 
and familiar" uncopyrightable 
shapes; unprotectable elements 
combined in an entirely standard 
and commonplace representation 
of a slice of pizza. Each claim to 
copyright is examined on its own 
merits; de minimus and trivial. 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
LA Rocks 2017 
Three-dimensional 
artwork, Jewelry design, 
Originality, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Fails to satisfy creative 
authorship; arrangement of 
unprotectable elements not 
suffiicently creative; simple 
relation of shapes; basic 













Lacks modicum of creativity; 
results of particular faceting 
technique; certian jewelry designs 
only have de minimus creativity; 
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Title Year Categories Brief Reasoning Outcome 





Computer program, Text, 
Originality, Rule of Doubt 
Sufficiently original as textual 
work-- works properly registered 
as text; NOT enough for 
computer program because it 





Cat Chair et al 
2017 
Three-dimensional 
artwork, Useful article, 
Originality, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Works are useful articles; basic 










Labels and logos, 
Common 
shapes/symbols/designs, 
Compilations, Words and 
short phrases 
Combination of elements not 










Lacked originality because "it 
contains only material 
predetermined by functional 
considerations"; do not satisfy 
"de minimus" quantum of 
creativity; mathematical 
princniples not entitled to 
copyright protection; de minimus 
authorship; brief descriptive 
labels and graphs do not rise 








Originality, Layout and 
format 
Sufficient (although minimal) 
amount of authorship; 
compilations-- arrangement of its 
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Title Year Categories Brief Reasoning Outcome 
Derivative for 
Distribution 
2017 Text, Originality 
Original text and combination of 
standard legal language, taken as 
a whole, meets the low creativity 
threshold articulated in Feist. 








artwork, Useful article, 
Originality, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Individual elements are all minor 
variations of common and 
familiar uncopyrightable shapes; 
common patterns not protected; 
arrangement are combined in a 
standard and commonplace 
manner, dictated by the shape of 
the sock and foot. 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
Intel Spiral 2017 
Musical work, Sound 
recording, Originality, 
Rule of doubt 
Musical work not copyrightable 
because it has few elements (one 
note and an arpeggio); no spark 
of creativity; Sound recording 
eligible because its more than the 











Design is too familar and 
ordinary to qualify for copyright 
protection; no two panels are ever 
the same-- wants to register the 
process. Go get a patent? 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
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artwork, Useful article, 
Originality, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Useful article; table legs not 
physically separable from the 
table itself-- the legs cannot be 
imagined separately and 
independently from the useful 
article; even if they could, the 
legs are comprised of two 
common geometric shapes (de 







2017 Text, Originality 
"minimal degree of creativity" 
was found. Combination of 









Words and short phrases, 
Typography, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Insufficient claim in text-- all 
words and short phrases such as 
names, titles, and slogans; 
Graphic elements are not 
individually subject to copyright 
protection; combination of 
elements are not the product of 
creative choices, but are typical 
of envelopes or advertising 
generally. Other design elements 
lack sufficient creativity 
Refusal 
Affirmed 






A few solid-colored geometric 
shapes; combination insufficient 
because the five components are 
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Simple, minor variations on 
common shapes or symbols 
consisting of a few geometric 
shapes arranged in an obvious 
manner; very few elements that 
are minor variations on common 
shapes; copyright office evaluates 
the final work, not the possible 










Labels and logos, 
Typography, Words and 
short phrases 
Work's constituent elements are 
not individually subject to 
protection (words, typeface, basic 
shapes, symbols, or coloring); 
combination doesn't reach level 
of creativity necessary for 
protection; typical design of a 
logo; intangible attributes can't be 
examined in an objective manner 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
Oval Sculpture - 






A concentric arrangement of 
single shapes is entirely 
predictable; choice of colors not 
sufficiently creative; tiering effect 
is not original; creative 











Commonplace design; simple 
addition of a certain setting 
doesn't change anything 
Refusal 
Affirmed 






So many issues, mostly 
insufficient deposits, may be a 
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Title Year Categories Brief Reasoning Outcome 
Small 
Geometrica 






Common geometric shapes; 
arrangement exhibits de minimus 
authorship; aesthetic or emotional 
effects on the viewer are not 












Gem cutting is generally not 
copyrightable; protection doesn't 
extend to procedure, process, or 
method; labor doesn't equal 
copyright protection; entirely 
composed of common geometric 
shapes; level of creative 











Authorship not sufficient; doesn't 
meet definition of computer 
software; uncopyrightable 
collection of facts; no sufficient 











Authorship not sufficient; 
selection is insufficient because 










Words and short phrases, 
Typography, Labels and 
logos 
Registerable as literary works, 
not two dimensional artworks; 
artwork is composed of graphics 
that are included to function as an 
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Title Year Categories Brief Reasoning Outcome 
3-Dimensional 
Pattern 6 - 
Gradient 






Useful article, Textile 
Works are minor variations on a 
basic stitching pattern in the 
public domain; copies of things in 
public domain cannot be 
copyrighted; pattern here is 
monochromatic and demonstrates 











Lack of requisite creative 
authorship; bezeling and 
recessing merely accent the 
common rectangular and square 
shapes; H and T cutouts are mere 
variations of uncopyrightable 
letters or words; level of creative 









Lack of requisite separable 
authorship; selection, 
coordination, and arrangement of 
basic elements (categories of 
medications and names of 
medications) is insufficient to 
render the Work original; 










Labels and logos 
Combination of elements not 
sufficiently original; 
compendium third 905; common 
geometric shape; basic 
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simplistic arrangement of non-
protectable elements; elements 
not protectable, arrangement is 
not sufficient to render it original; 
"pseud-rectangular shape is 
dictated by a symbol firmly in the 
public commons-- the American 
flag"; slight variation on a 









Labels and logos 
Elements not individually subject 
to copyright protection; Coach; 
common shape for app icons; 
simple combination of a few 
familiar symbols or designs with 
minor linear or spatial variations 
Refusal 
Affirmed 








Individual elements not subject 
to copyright; mere variations on 
familiar symbols; arranged in 
predictable and simplistic 
manner; symbolic meaning 
irrelevant to copyrightability; "a 
work may exhibit a 'fresh take' on 





Sculpture et al 
2016 
Three-dimensional 
artwork, Useful article, 
Originality, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
No separable design features; 
creative authorship de minimus at 
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Title Year Categories Brief Reasoning Outcome 
Aviator 




artwork, Useful article, 
Originality, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
No separable design features; 
creative authorship de minimus at 








artwork, Useful article, 
Originality, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Little evidence of inventive 
combination; minimal amount of 
basic, geometric molding in a 
predictable linear fashion 
Refusal 
Affirmed 





Labels and logos 
Constituent elements not subject 
to copyright protection; 
Combination not sufficent; 
graphic logo design consists only 
of "spatial palcement or format"/ 
"uncopyrightable use of color, 
frames or borders; lacks requisite 
amount of creativity 
Refusal 
Affirmed 





Bowtie element as common 
geometric shapes; basic 
combination does not possess 









Not individually subject to 
copyright protection; selection is 
not sufficent; naturally occuring 
features; level of creative 
authorship as de minimus and too 
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Title Year Categories Brief Reasoning Outcome 





Words and short phrases 
Elements not individually subject 
to copyright protection; creative 
aspects of character not separable 
from utilitarian nature of the 
character; not sufficient for 
compilation-- combining 
uncopyrightable elements didn't 
result in work with sufficient 
creativity; attributing 
anthropomorphic characteristics 





artwork, Useful article, 
Originality, Layout and 
format, Labels and logos 
Bottle doesn't contain 
conceptually separable pictorial 
and graphic features (embossing, 
rising sun motif, stylized agave 
plants); not copyrightable as 














Blank forms not subject to 
copyright protection; not 








artwork, Useful article, 
Originality, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Useful article that lacks 
separable creative authorship 
Refusal 
Affirmed 







Labels and logos, 
Typography 
None of the works individually 
subject to copyright protection; 
simple combination of wording; 
uncopyrightable coloring, words 
dictated by industry standards, 
contact information, short phrases 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
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Title Year Categories Brief Reasoning Outcome 
Design Cube 2016 
Three-dimensional 
artwork, Useful article, 
Originality, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Combination of common or 
standard design elements contains 
sufficient creativity because of 
the way they are arranged; design 
elements/arrangement of more 
than thirty varying shapes goes 




Desk Accessory 2016 
Three-dimensional 
artwork, Useful article, 
Originality, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Useful article with separabilty, 
but features don't exhibit creative 
authorship; work as larger 
version of familiar and standard 
pencil; "the Work is a slavish 
representation of a standard 
pencil"; comprised of standard 
circles and hexagonal shapes, 
staced in simplistic linear manner 
Refusal 
Affirmed 






constituent elements not 
individually subject to copyright 
protection; selection and 
arragnement of letters and 
negative space is not sufficient to 
render Work original; intangible 
attributes cannot be examined in 
an objective manner 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
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Eva Fehren X 




constituent elements not 
individually subject to copyright 
protection; selection, arrangement 
not sufficient to render Work 
original; mere variations of 
standard X or cross design and 
placement are typical of jewelry 
but lack requisite creativity; de 
minimus and triival creativity 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
Fiore Sculpture 2016 
Three-dimensional 
artwork, Useful article, 
Originality, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Useful article; no separable 
authorship to sustain a claim in 
copyright; individual elements of 
design are not copyrightable 










collectively result in a 14 second 
routine that is de minimus; simple 
gestures and movements; 
collection and arrangement are 
insufficient; execution of dancer 








Words and short phrases, 
Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Inidividual elements not subject 
to protection; combination not 
suffiicent because there are 
relatively few elements; simple 
combination of a few basic 
elements not protectable 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
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Title Year Categories Brief Reasoning Outcome 
Globe Design – 







constituent elements are standard 
geometric shapes and color 
variations that do not individually 
qualify for protection; 
arrangement not sufficient 
because there are only a few 
design elements with minor linear 
or spatial variations; complexity 
of design not enough; granting 
copyright in globe design would 
give copyright to idea of globe 
Refusal 
Affirmed 




No individual element of the 
Work is copyrightable; 
coordination and arrangement is 
not sufficient to render the work 
original; combined in standard 










Rule of doubt 
Doesn't contain requisite 
creativity; relatively few elements 
that are all common and familiar 
shapes; arranged in common and 
obvious manner; actual work that 
must be evaluated, not the variety 
of choices available to the author 
Refusal 
Affirmed 




Originality, Words and 
short phrases 
legal text lacks sufficeint 
originality; not the reslt of 
independent creation (U.S. 
Government sources); heading 
and security text not subject to 
copyright protection; compilation 
not sufficient because ti is 
obvious and has minor creativity; 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
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Labels and logos 
Individual elements not subject 
to copyright protection; 
combination not protectable 
because it is obvious that the 
creative spark is lacking; 
arrangement neither unique nor 
distinctive; work is a "simple 
arrangement"; it is not the variety 
of choices available to the author 












Constituent elements not subject 
to copyright; none of the Works 
possesses sufficient creativity in 
the selection, combination, and 
arrangement; these basic 
combinations of a single word or 
obviousvariation of a fimilar 










Work is useful article and doesn't 
contain requisite separable 
authorship; doesn't have more 
than de minimus quantum of 
creativity; relatively predictable 
combination of two 
uncopyrightable elements; can't 
consider appeal based on the 
concept, process, or effort 
Refusal 
Affirmed 




artwork, Useful article, 
Originality, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Work is a useful article that 
contains requisite separable 
original authorship; headphones 
with microphone-- no 
separability; elements insufficient 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
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Title Year Categories Brief Reasoning Outcome 
JJ 1 Logo et al 2016 
Two-dimensional 
artwork, Originality, 
Labels and logos, 
Typography 
Elements not individually subject 
to copyright protection; 
combination not sufficient-- basic 
variation in typographic 
expression; level of authorship as 
de minimus and trivial; cannot be 
described as "highly stylzed" 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
















artwork, Useful article, 
Originality, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Useful articles that do not 
contain separable authorship; 
mere addition of relatively few 
colors to a preexisting design not 
subject to copyright; level of 











Work does not contain requisite 
separability; single shape not 
sufficiently creative to warrant 
copyright protection; fails to meet 
creativity threshold; simple 
arrangement of three spherical 
shapes, stacked atop eachother 
from largest to smallest 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
Mice Mischief - 
Math Facts in 
Action 
2016 Text, Originality 
Work exhibits copyrightable 




2018] REGISTRATION IS FUNDAMENTAL 49 
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Words and short phrases, 
Labels and logos 
Fails to satisfy the requirement 
of creative authorship; individual 
scales are not protectable; too 
familiar and ordinary to qualify 
for copyright protection; common 
accessory and jewelry design, 
natural design; initials and name 
are uncopyrightable; design 
elements result from 
unprotectable, functional 
considerations; combination not 
copyrightable because elements 
are "repeated in a standard 












Labels and logos 
individual elements not subject 
to copyright protection; 
combination not protectable 
because the Work is little more 
than a white square set within a 
blue rectangle over the word 
"Nationwide"; intangible 
attributes are not evident from 
deposit and cannot be examined 
in an objective manner; 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
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Typography, Labels and 
logos 
Constituent elements not subject 
to copyright; selection, 
coordination, and arrangement 
consist of little more than a blue 
octagon with a white boarder and 
a rectangle consisting of letters 
ADT printed at its center. 
Common geometric shapes must 
be sufficiently creative; variations 
in coloring alone are not eligible 





Cover with Ten 




Originality, Useful article, 
Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Digital Image Works: commonplace to 
a multitude of industries, including the 
heating and electrical industry; Cover 
Works: plain casing and four to ten 
images-- elements already registered or 
are not protectable because they are 
additional mere familiar designs such as 
simple arrows; combination doesn't 
warrant protection because they are 












Thin copyright protection 
granted to the specific pattern; 
does not extend to any variations 
Refusal 
Reversed 
People Pleaser 2016 
Two-dimensional 
artwork, Text, Originality, 
Common 
shapes/symbols/designs, 
Words and short phrases 
Short phrases categorically lack 
minimum level of creativity; de 
minimus creative expression 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
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Rule of doubt 
Common and familiar forms that 
are in the public domain; obvious 
arrangement; not enough 
creativity to merit copyright 
protection; sylistic choices and 
design alternatives have no 
bearing on the board's analysis 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
Q Family 2016 
Three-dimensional 
artwork, Useful article, 
Originality 
Appearance not separable from 









artwork, Useful article, 
Originality 
Useful article that does not 










Unprotectable elements; designs 
are "mere variations on a 
common or standardized design 











Words and short phrases, 
Labels and logos, Layout 
and format 
Many of the works' elements not 
eligible for protection; 
combination is not sufficient 











Work is created by, or intended 
to duplicate, nature 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
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Simplistic arrangement of non-
protectable elements; only a few 
musical notes standing alone are 
not enough; no aesthetic 
judgements; unique or distinctive 
shape or style for purposes of 
aesthetic appeal doesn't mean the 
work constitutes a copyrightable 
work of art 
Refusal 
Affirmed 







Words and short phrases, 
Typography 
Constituent elements not subject 
to copyright protection; selection, 
coordination, or arrangement not 
sufficient; typical propeller 
beanie set in a blue background 









Contituent elements not subject 
to copyright protection; 
Selection, coordination, 
arrangement are insufficient to 
render work original. Basic 






Handles et al 
2016 
Two-dimensional 
artwork, Useful article, 
Originality, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Work is conceptually separable 
but doesn't meet de minimus 
quantum of creativity; mere 
placement of shapes in an arc 
configuration, however, is a 
common design approach and 
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Selection, coordination, and 
arragnement of "two misshapen 
ovals and rectangles, separated 
but curved lines" is not sufficient; 
trademark argument; not 








artwork, Useful article, 
Originality, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Conceptually separable, but the 
individual elements are not 
subject to copyright protection. 
Combination of conceptually 
separable individual elements is 
NOT sufficient because the 
placement of shapes is based on 
structural support elements + is 





Handles et al 
2016 
Two-dimensional 
artwork, Useful article, 
Originality, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Works do not contain requisite 
separable authorship; does not 









Constituent elements not subject 
to copyright protection; 
combination not original because 
the design consists of little more 
than two overlapping Vs that are 










Words and short phrases, 
Typography 
Selection, arrangement, 
coordination does not reflect 
sufficient choice and authorial 
discretion that is not so obvious 
or minor that the "Creative spark 
is utterly lacking or so trivial as 
to be nonexistent." 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
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What Is In Your 
Soul - Round 






No individual element of the 
work is copyrightable; selection 
and arrangement do not display 
minimal level of creativity-- 
selection is de minimus (few 
number of elements); potential 







artwork, Useful article, 
Originality, Common 
shapes/symbols/designs 
Useful article that does not 
contain requisite separability to 
sustain a claim in copyright; this 
would maybe be different after 
Star Athletica 
Refusal 
Affirmed 
 
